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ABSTRACT 
 
It is well known that height is positively associated with earnings. Based on 
individual level data, this paper investigates the channels through which height 
influences income in China. Our first key finding is that taller people are more 
likely to become members of the Communist Party, resulting in an increase in their 
income level. We label this the height premium in earnings through the political 
channel. Second, controlling for the political channel of the height premium, height 
is positively associated with income in the labor market. We label this the height 
premium through the market channel. Third, the height premium in earnings 
through the market channel is larger than that through the political channel.  
 
 
 
JEL classification: J08; J24; P26 
Keywords: Labor market, China, Height, Communist membership. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that human capital, accumulated through education and 
experience, is positively correlated with income in a market economy. In addition, 
an increasing number of studies suggest that individuals’ physical characteristics 
are related to economic returns1. One key physical characteristic is height, which 
has attracted much attention among researchers2. Existing studies have explored 
the role played by height in the labor market and found a height-wage premium in 
developed Western countries (Schultz 2002; Heineck 2005, 2009; Case & Paxson 
2008, 2009; Kortt & Leigh 2010). The height-wage premium has also been observed 
in China (Gao & Smyth 2010)3. Height reflects the degree of investment in health 
human capital, which improves performance in the labor market.  
The contribution of individual ability and skill to the wage premium can be 
expected to vary under different institutional conditions and, in particular, between  
market and non-market economies. Our contribution is to analyze the height-wage 
premium in China by paying particular attention to the institutional setting. 
Specifically, we consider the role of alternative channels, which we label market and 
political channels, in contributing to the height-wage premium. In China, the rapid 
development of the market has been an outgrowth of economic reform. Hence, one 
reason why health human capital, reflected in height, has been important in 
increasing earnings might be that human capital plays an important role in the 
market economy (Li 2003). We call this the market channel. However, in China, not 
only human capital but also political capital should be taken into account when 
considering the factors that contribute to economic success (Bian et al. 2001; Liu, 
2003; Li et al. 2007). Communist Party members have been found to earn higher 
wages in China (e.g. Appleton et al. 2005; Bishop & Liu 2008). We define the 
political channel as the potential height-wage premium that accrues if taller people 
are more likely to become members of the Chinese Communist Party.    
A natural question to ask is how is height is evaluated in terms of politics? If 
height is positively regarded not only in the “labor market” but also in the “political 
market”, the height premium in earnings may be generated indirectly through the 
                                                   
1 Previous studies provide evidence of the beauty premium in the labor market (e.g. 
Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; Biddle & Hamermesh 1998; Borland & Leigh, 2014; 
Hamermesh et al., 2002).  
2 Weight is also observed to affect wage levels (Brunello & D’hombres, 2007; Shimokawa 
2008). 
3 Other studies have examined the relationship between height and living standards in 
China (Morgan 2000; 2004) and the role of height in dating in China (Ong, 2014). 
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political channel. We attempt to assess whether height is related to earnings 
through the political channel and the relative role of the market and political 
channels.  We find that height is positively related to income, not only through the 
market channel but also through political channel. The association via the market 
channel, though, is overwhelmingly larger than that through the political channel.  
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the Chinese context 
and existing literature is reviewed. Section 3 proposes several testable hypotheses. 
Section 4 provides an overview of the data and empirical method. Section 5 presents, 
and discusses, the major findings.  The last section concludes. 
 
2. Chinese context and existing literature 
The Chinese Communist Party maintained a high level of control over the wage and 
promotion structure prior to the market reform period (Groves et al., 1995). In the 
planning period, members of the Communist Party benefited from better entry-level 
jobs and career paths (Walder, 1995).  In the market reform period, beginning in 
the 1980s in urban areas, the Communist Party relaxed its formal control over the 
allocation of labor and wage setting is now more flexible. Enterprises, even in the 
state sector, now have much more managerial autonomy and wages and promotion 
are more closely linked to performance and productivity. Moreover, the operation of 
market forces has been entrenched through a withering of the state-owned sector 
and a rapid expansion of the private sector. The private sector, broadly defined to 
include firms with foreign capital, accounted for just under three quarters of 
industrial output in 2011. At the same time, the state-owned share of industrial 
output was 26% in 2011, compared with almost 80% in 1979 (Lardy, 2014). 
The screening criteria for Party membership have changed over time (Han, 
2007). Prior to the market reform period, the primary criteria for Party membership 
was loyalty to the Party and class origin. In the market reform period, and 
particularly since the 1990s, ability has become the most important criteria with 
much more emphasis placed on education (Appleton et al. 2009). In 1990 less than 
1% of Party members were college students. By 2005, this figure had increased to 
8% with one quarter of all new members being college students (Han, 2007). At the 
same time, the importance of class origin, as a screening criteria, has declined over 
time. Walder (1995) and Li and Walder (2001) argue that the Party seeks out 
individuals with high ability and rewards them through the market mechanism as 
part of a strategy to enable it to maintain its stranglehold on political power. 
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Our study is related to at least four strands of literature on the Chinese economic 
and political landscape. The first is studies examining the determinants of who 
becomes a Party member (Bishop & Liu, 2008; Han, 2007). The second is studies 
examining the economic returns to being a Party member (see eg. Appleton et al., 
2009; Bishop & Liu, 2008; Lam, 2003; Li et al., 2007; Liu, 2003). The third is studies 
examining the changing role of Party membership in obtaining elite occupations 
and other benefits (Li & Walder, 2001; Walder, 1995). The fourth is studies 
examining the economic returns to physical appearance in the Chinese labor 
market, including height (Gao & Smyth, 2010) and weight (Shimokawa, 2008). 
There are no studies examining the relative importance of the market and political 
channels influencing the height-wage premium. We consider the role of height as a 
screening criteria for Party membership, in effect proxying for unobservable ability, 
and the direct and indirect economic returns to height in the labor market.          
 
3. Hypotheses 
The Party uses height as a screening device to attract talented individuals. Bishop 
and Liu (2008) found that the Party acts as a screening device to identify less well 
educated, but high ability, individuals. The problem is that innate ability is 
unobservable. Height captures unobserved characteristics such as innate ability. 
Several studies conclude that height is a good proxy for cognitive ability and that 
the association between height and cognitive ability persists through life (see eg. 
Case & Paxson, 2008).  Clearly height is a marker for political success. Persico et al. 
(2004) reported that Presidents of the United States are inclined to be taller than 
the average American population and that taller candidates tend to win 
Presidential elections. It is reasonable to think that taller people use Party 
membership to derive economic rents. Height is a proxy for ability and it is in the 
interests of the Party to reward Party members of high ability for their loyalty 
through the market (Walder, 1995). In China, the increasing acceptance of income 
inequality may make it easier for Party members to convert their political power 
into economic power, allowing them to earn higher income (Bishop & Liu 2008). 
Party members of high ability, proxied by height, are best placed to convert political 
power into economic power in the market. This suggests the following hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1: Height and income are positively correlated via the political channel 
 
We now turn to why height is rewarded in the market independent of any 
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possible political channel. First, taller people tend to be stronger and, hence, can be 
expected to be more productive, particularly in jobs involving physical labor 
(Lundborg et al., 2014). This can be especially important in many sectors in 
developing countries, such as China. Second, as discussed above, height is 
associated with cognitive ability, which can be expected to be rewarded in the 
market (Case & Paxson, 2008). Third, height in adulthood depends on height in 
adolescence. Persico et al. (2004) argues that individuals who are taller during 
adolescence are better able to accumulate human capital in adolescence and this is 
rewarded in later life in the labor market. Fourth, taller people may have higher 
self-esteem or exude more self-confidence. This may allow them to communicate 
with colleagues better and, hence, make them more productive. Similarly, taller 
people may be better negotiators and thus better able to negotiate higher salaries 
with employers in the labor market. These arguments suggest the hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 2: Height and income are positively correlated via the market channel 
 
Next, we consider the relative strength of the relationship between height 
and income for males and females. We conjecture that the relative strength of the 
relationship between height and income will be more important for males than 
females. First, as discussed above, height is likely to be correlated with productivity 
in jobs involving physical labor. Males will tend to be disproportionately 
represented in physically demanding jobs, suggesting the height-wage premium 
will be larger for males. Second, height is correlated with dominant personality 
traits that are rewarded in the market. Evolutionary psychology suggests that these 
are more important for males than females (Blaker et al., 2013).  
 
Hypothesis 3. The positive correlation between height and income via both market 
and political channels will be stronger for males than females. 
 
There has been an expansion of market forces over the reform period. The 
economic reforms have created a ‘space’ in which markets have flourished and 
wages are flexible. One would expect that in such an environment human capital 
and physical characteristics would have a significant influence on economic returns. 
The evidence suggests it does. Returns to human capital have increased over the 
market reform period (Gao & Smyth, 2015). Studies have identified that physical 
appearance captured by beauty (Hamermesh et al., 2002), height (Gao & Smyth, 2010) 
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and weight (Shimokawa, 2008) earn economic rents/penalties. While the market has 
increased in importance in the allocation of resources, the wage premium from 
being a Party member has not declined. On the contrary, the evidence from existing 
studies is that it has increased (Appleton et al., 2009; Bishop & Liu, 2008). 
The effect of the market channel on height, however, is direct, while the 
effect of the political channel on height is indirect via political influence. Therefore, 
while we expect both political and market channels to positively influence the 
height-wage premium, the direct effect of the market channel can be expected to 
have increased relative to the indirect effect of the political channel. This reflects 
the fact that the Party has reduced its formal role in the allocation of resources (at 
the expenses of the market) and that while this is extensive, its influence is more 
subtle. Thus, we expect the market channel to be larger, suggesting the hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4. The effect of height on income via the market channel will be larger 
than the effect of height on income via the political channel.  
 
4. Data and methods 
4.1. Data 
We use data from the Chinese General Social Survey 2008 (CGSS 2008) collected by 
the Department of Sociology, Renmin University of China, Beijing in 20084. CGSS 
2008 was a nationally representative survey, administered in 27 provinces, collected 
between September and December 2008. All respondents are Chinese with an urban 
hukou (household registration) and are aged 18 and above. The data were collected 
via face-to-face interview, in which the questionnaires were filled in by the 
interviewers. The initial sample size was 6000, but the number of observations used 
in this study was reduced to 3581 once missing observations were removed5.  
The GGSS 2008 contains information regarding basic socioeconomic individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, household income, occupation, ownership form of 
employer, years of schooling, marital status, family members and province of residence. 
Importantly, in terms of our research question, the dataset also contains information on 
the respondent’s height, whether the respondent is a member of the Communist Party, 
                                                   
4 The CGSS 2008 has been conducted as a part of the East Asian Social Survey 2008 (EASS 
2008) project. EASS 2008 was designed to contribute to the broader provision of 
Cross-National Survey Data Sets concerning "Culture and Globalization in East Asia". 
Other datasets in the same series are the Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), Korean 
General Social Survey (KGSS) and Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS). 
5 See Bian and Li (2012) for details on sample design, data collection and quality control in 
the CGSS. 
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and if his (her) father and mother is a member of the Communist Party. The great 
advantage of the dataset is that it allows us to assess not only effect of respondent’s 
height and Communist membership, but also that of parent’s Party membership. 
Table 1 shows the definitions of variables used in this paper and their basic 
statistics, such as mean value, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values. 
Apart from these variables, as discussed below, various control variables are included in 
the empirical specification, but the results for these variables are not reported to 
conserve space. Hence, information about control variables is omitted in Table 1 
.  We see from Table 1 that the mean value for Male is 0.48, indicating that the 
sample almost equally consists of males and females. Mean values of Party, Father 
Party and Mother Party are 0.11, 0.13, and 0.02, respectively. This suggests that 11 % of 
respondents are Communist Party members, 13% of respondents’ fathers are 
Communist Party members and that 2% of respondents’ mothers are Party members. 
Therefore, the number of male Party members in the sample is approximately five times 
larger than that of the number of female members. Accordingly, compared with females, 
males can be considered to have a political advantage in terms of pursuing institutional 
rents by virtue of being members of the Communist Party.  
Table 2 shows the difference in income between Communist Party members and 
non-members. Based on the full sample, income of members is higher by 9800 RMB 
than that of non-members and this difference is statistically significant at the 1 % 
level. If the sample is restricted to males, the difference in income is 7900 RMB, 
while for the female sample the difference in income is 9500 RMB. Hence, the 
difference in income between Communist members and non-members is larger for 
females than for males. This implies that Communist Party membership plays a 
greater role in increasing income for females than for males (assuming all other 
things equal). Table 2 also shows the difference in income between male and female 
Communist Party members and the corresponding difference for non-members. It is 
interesting to observe that there is no statistical difference in income between male 
and female Communist members, while for non-members the income of males is 
5900 RMB higher than for females, which is statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
All in all, the difference in income between males and females is smaller than the 
difference in income between members and non-members. That is, in China, 
Communist Party membership plays a more important role in contributing to 
differences in income levels than gender differences. 
Figures 1 (a) and (b) illustrate the relationship between height and income for 
males and females. A positive relationship is observed in Figures 1(a) and (b), 
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indicating a height premium in earnings for males as well as females. This is in line 
with previous findings for China reported in Gao and Smyth (2010). 
Table 3 shows differences in height between Communist Party members and 
non-members. We see from Table 3 that, based on the full sample, the height of 
Communist Party members is higher by 4.2 centimeters (cm) than that of 
non-members and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Even 
after dividing the sample into males and females, the height of members is higher 
than non-members for males and females. The differences are 1.2 cm and 1.7cm for 
males and females, respectively. Figures 2 (a) and (b) illustrate the relationship 
between height and Party membership for males and females. We observe a positive 
relationship in Figures 2 (a) and (b), implying that the taller people are, the more 
they are likely to be a member. It follows from Table 3 and Figures 2(a) and (b) that 
there is a height premium for being a Communist Party member.  
 
4.2. Methods 
 
In order to assess the channels through which height has an effect on income, we 
adopt the following approach. In the first step, a probit model is used to ascertain 
the determinants of being a Communist Party member. We examine the relation 
between height and membership. The estimated function takes the form as below: 
 
Party i =α0 + α1Height i + α2 Father Party i + α3 Mother Party i + α4Schooling i  + 
α5Age i  + α6 Age squared i  + α7Male i+ Y’ iBi + u i, 
where Party i  represents the dependent variable for individual i. The main 
independent variables are shown in the function. From our argument thus far, the 
coefficient of Height is expected to have a positive sign. Appleton et al. (2009) 
argued: “The Party looks for recruits who are committed to its values and will 
participate actively in politics” (Appleton et al. 2008, 260). If one’s parents are 
members of the Party, this is a key leading indicator. Thus, parental membership of 
the Communist Party is an indicator of loyalty and sound class background 
(Appleton et al. 2008). The coefficients on Father Party  and Mother Party are 
expected to have a positive sign. If this proves to be correct, political advantage can 
be considered to be inherited from generation to generation. Schooling is included to 
determine the extent to which human capital, through education, plays a role in 
“the political market”. The predicted sign of Schooling is positive. Further, basic 
demographic factors are taken into account by including age and gender. Apart from 
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these variables, the vectors of the control variables are denoted by Y i. These control 
variables are residential province dummies, health status dummies, dummies for 
location of the school from which respondents graduated, dummies for number of family 
members, occupation dummies, dummies for ownership form of employer and marital 
status dummies. The regression parameters are denoted by α, and B is the vector of 
the regression parameters for the control variables. The error term is denoted by u. 
The empirical specification follows the model employed by Appleton et al. (2009) to 
examine the determinants of Communist Party membership. 
  In the second step, we investigate the determinants of annual income level6. 
Income of some respondents is zero, representing left-censored observations. In 
these circumstances the Tobit model is suitable and is so used for estimation7. The 
estimated function takes a similar form to that used in the first step estimation8: 
Income i =β0 +β1 Party i +β2 Height i +β3 Father Party i +β4 Mother Party i 
+β5Schooling i  +β6Age i  +β7 Age squared i +β8Male i+ Z’ iCi + e i, 
In addition to the set of independent variables used in the first step estimation 
(probit model), Party is included to examine the association between income and 
party membership, which captures political influence on income. Considering the 
results for Height in the probt and Tobit estimation allows us to assess the height 
premium on income through the political channel. Since, in the Tobit estimation, 
the effect of height on income via the political channel is controlled by including 
Party, the result for Height in the Tobit model captures the effect of height via the 
market channel. As for other control variables, most of them are widely used in the 
                                                   
6 Using hourly wages is preferable to income (Li, 2003). However, hourly wage cannot be 
obtained from CGSS 2008 and so annual income level is used. Annual income has been 
employed as the dependent variable in related studies, such as Bishop and Liu (2008).  
7 In the existing literature, the logarithm of hourly wage (or income) is used as the 
dependent variable. However, respondents reporting no income would need to be deleted 
from the sample if we used that approach in this paper. This leads to selection bias. 
Therefore, we do not use logarithm of income in this paper. Instead of using logarithm of 
income, the semi-elasticity (d(lny)/d(x)), is numerically calculated after estimation. 
8 There is an argument that the Communist Party seeks to recruit economically productive 
members (Appleton et al. 2009). Hence, people with higher earnings are possibly likely to be 
Communist Party members. If this holds true, causality between income and Party 
membership is ambiguous, resulting in problems of endogeneity bias. There is an argument 
that “parental membership is likely to be correlated with own membership… [but] parental 
membership may not have a strong direct effect on own wages” (Appleton et al. 2009, 266). 
Following this argument, we used parental membership dummies (Father member and 
Mother member) as exogenous instruments for Party to conduct 2SLS estimation. However, 
results of the endogeneity test for Party did not suggest that Party is an endogenous 
variable in any estimations (as is reported in Tables 4-6). Therefore, Party is treated as an 
exogenous variable in the Tobit estimation. This is the reason why the probit estimation and 
Tobit estimation are conducted separately. 
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existing literature when considering determinants of wage or income (e.g. Appleton 
et al., 2005, 2009; Bishop and Liu 2008; Gao and Smyth 2010, 2015). 
We use the full sample in order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 proposed in Section 3.   
We divide the sample into males and females to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 
 
5. Results and discussion 
The regression estimates for both the probit and Tobit specifications are reported in 
Tables 4-6. Results based on the full sample are presented in Table 4. After dividing 
the sample into males and females, results based on the male sample are presented 
in Table 5, while those based on the female sample are presented in Table 6. In each 
Table, results for the probit model are shown in column (1), while those for the Tobit 
model are in column (2). In the probit estimation, values without parentheses show 
the marginal effect, indicating the change in probability of being a Communist 
Party member when the independent variable increases by one point. In the Tobit 
estimation, values without parentheses 9 show the change in the logarithm of 
income when the independent variable increases by one point. 
First, we begin by interpreting the results in Table 4. Consistent with 
expectations, the coefficient on Height has a positive sign and is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level in column (1). This suggests that height plays a critical 
role in selecting individuals to be Communist Party members. The absolute value of 
its coefficient is 0.003, indicating that a 1 cm increase in height leads to 0.3% 
increase in probability that one becomes a member. Coefficients on Father party, 
and Mother party also have a positive sign and are statistically significant at the 
1 % level in column (1). This means that parental membership increases the 
likelihood that individuals become Party members, which is consistent with class 
background being used as a screening criteria. Absolute values of the coefficient on 
Father party and Mother party are 0.058 and 0.092, suggesting that the probability 
that individuals become a Party member is higher by 5.8% (9.2 %) if their father 
(mother) is a member. In addition, in line with expectation, Schooling yields a 
significantly positive sign, such that higher education leads individuals to become 
members. The coefficient on Male is also positive and statistically significant. This 
result suggests that the gender difference in the probability of becoming a 
Communist Party member is persistently observed in 2008, although Appleton et al. 
(2009) reported that the difference diminished from 1988 to 1999.   
                                                   
9 The value is the semi-elasticity (d(lny)/d(x)), which is calculated at the means of the 
independent variables after estimation. 
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We now turn to the results in column (2) in Table 4. The coefficient on Party has 
the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1 % level. This 
means that Communist Party membership is positively associated with income. The 
absolute value of the coefficient is 0.222, which implies that Communist Party 
members’ income is 22.2% larger than non-members. On the other hand, the 
coefficients on Father party, and Mother party are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, parental membership is not associated with income through the market 
channel. The combined results of Party, Father party, and Mother party imply that 
the market functions well and that parent’s political power is associated with 
income only through the political channel and not through the market channel10. In 
the case of parental membership, such reverse causality does not hold. Consistent 
with the prediction, the sign on the coefficient of Height is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 % level. Therefore, even after controlling for the effect of height 
on income via the political channel, height is positively related to income. The 
significant positive sign for Schooling is in line with standard economic theory. The 
sign on Male is positive and significant, suggesting that females are discriminated 
against in the labor market. The results for Schooling and Male are consistent with 
extant studies (Appleton et al. 2005, 2009; Gao & Smyth, 2015). Combined results 
in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Let us switch attention to Tables 5 and 6. Here, we focus on a few key variables; 
Party, Height, Father party and Mother party. In column (2) of Table 5, Party, 
Height, Father party and Mother party all have a statistically significant positive 
coefficient. This is in line with expectations. With respect to column (2) of Table 5, a 
significant positive sign is observed for the coefficient on Party and Height. Father 
party and Mother party have a negative sign, but are not statistically significant. In 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, the results are similar to Table 5. The absolute value 
of the coefficient of Father Party is larger (smaller) than that of Mother Party in 
Table 5 (Table 6). This can be interpreted as implying that if the respondent’s 
parent is a Party member of the same gender as the respondent this has a larger 
influence on the probability that the respondent will become a member.   
In order to more closely examine the effect of parental membership and height 
on income, we now turn to Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 suggests the effect of parents 
                                                   
10 Bishop and Liu (2008) find that spouse’s Communist Party membership is positively 
associated with income. However, there is the possibility that Communist Party members 
can marry high earners because of the Party premium in the marriage market. If this holds, 
reverse causality leads to bias in the results of spouse’s membership reported in Bishop and 
Liu (2008). 
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being Party members on income occurs through market and political channels. We 
see from Table 7 that parental membership is associated with income only through 
the market channel. One’s income level is higher by 2.34 % (2.22 %) for males 
(females) whose father (mother) are Party members. On the other hand, income is 
larger by 1.69 % (0.51 %) for males (females) whose mother (father) are Party 
members. This suggests that the membership premium is larger if one has a parent 
who was a Party member of the same gender. Turning to Table 8, for males a 1 cm 
increase in height leads to a 1.84 % (0.11%) increase in income through the market 
channel (political channel). For females, a 1 cm increase in height leads to a 0.82 % 
(0.08%) increase in income through the market channel (political channel). This 
strongly supports Hypothesis 3. Further, the effect of an additional 1 cm increase in 
height is larger through the market channel than political channel by an order of 
magnitude of 20-fold. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 4.  
When Tables 7 and 8 are jointly considered, membership of the same sex parents 
on income through the political channel is larger than the effects of a 1 cm height 
effect through the market channel. The father membership effect on male income is 
equivalent to a 1.22 cm increase in height through the market channel. The mother 
membership effect on female income is equivalent to a 2.69 cm increase in height 
through the market channel. Therefore, compared with the height effect on income, 
parent’s membership effect through the political channel is two times larger for 
females than males. Therefore, intergenerational political rent plays a more critical 
role in terms of income for females than for males.  
 
6. Conclusion 
A number of studies suggest that height is positively associated with earnings. 
However, it is likely that the influence of height in the labor market depends on the 
institutional setting. In a post-socialist economy one expects there to be a political 
influence on market outcomes For instance, Communist Party membership is 
thought to influence earnings through the political channel. There is the wage 
premium associated with being a member of the Party in China (Bishop & Liu 2008; 
Appleton et al., 2009). However, little is known about how height is related to Party 
membership, although a height premium has been observed in the Chinese labor 
market (Gao & Smyth 2010). Using individual level data for China, this paper has 
attempted to decompose the height premium on earnings into a premium through 
the political channel and a premium through the market channel. 
We found that height is positively related to being a member of the Communist 
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Party, which in turn leads to an increase in income level. This suggests that height 
indirectly influences income through the political channel. Even after controlling 
the height effect through the political channel, height is positively associated with 
income. Therefore, height affects income not only through the political channel, but 
also via the market channel. Further, the effect of height through the market 
channel is much larger (about 20 times larger) than that through the political 
channel. After dividing the sample into males and females, the height premium 
from Party membership is larger for males than females. In addition, compared 
with the height premium on income, parent’s membership premium through the 
political channel is relatively larger for females than males. The take home message 
is that the market mechanism functions well, although in China specific political 
power influences the labor market. Political influence on income proves to be more 
important for females than males. This result could reflect the scarcity of political 
talent among females compared with males, given there are fewer women in the 
Party. This, in turn raises the marginal political product of being female. 
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Figure 1 (a). Association between height and income for males. 
 
 
Figure 1(b). Association between height and income for females. 
   Note: mean value in each province is plotted. 
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Figure 2 (a). Association between height and Party membership for males. 
 
 
Figure 2(b). Association between height and Party membership for females. 
   Note: mean value in each province is plotted. 
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Table 1. Definition, and descriptive statistics, of variables used in empirical specifications.  
 Definitions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
Income Income level (thousand RMB) 14.3 26.4 1,000 0 
Party 1 if respondent is member of the Communist Party, otherwise 0. 
 
0.11 ---- 1 0 
Height Height (cm) 164 7.5 190 120 
Father Party 1 if respondent’s father is member of the Communist Party, otherwise 
0. 
0.13 ---- 1 0 
Mother Party 1 if respondent’s mother is member of the Communist Party, 
otherwise 0. 
0.02 ---- 1 0 
Age Age at time of the survey 
 
43.2 14.0 98 18 
Male 
 
1 if respondent is male, otherwise 0. 0.48 ---- 1 0 
Schooling Schooling years. 
 
0.51 ---- 1 0 
 
 21 
 
Table 2. Mean difference test of income level between members of the Communist Party and others (thousand RMB).  
 Member  
   (1) 
Non-member 
   
 (2) 
Difference in Income 
(1)-(2) 
t-values 
Full sample 
(I) 
  22.8    13.1 9.8    8.74*** 
Male sample 
        (II) 
  24.1    16.2 7.9    4.49*** 
Female sample 
        (III) 
  19.7    10.2 9.5    8.90*** 
Difference in Income  
(II)-(III) 
t-values 
(I) versus  (III) 
  4.3 
 
1.31 
  5.9 
 
8.17*** 
  
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 
Table 3. Mean difference test of height between members of the Communist Party and others (cm). 
 Member  
   (1) 
Non-member 
   
 (2) 
Difference in height 
(1)-(2) 
t-values 
Full sample 
 
  168.3    164.0 4.2 13.8*** 
Male sample 
        
  170.9    169.7 1.2    4.21*** 
Female sample 
        
  161.1    159.4 1.7    4.37*** 
 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4. Results for the full sample. 
 (1) 
Dependent variable: 
Party 
 
Model: 
Probit estimation 
(2) 
Dependent variable: 
Income 
 
Model: 
Tobit estimation 
Party  0.222*** 
(2.68) 
Height 0.003*** 
(3.72) 
0.016*** 
(2.89) 
Father Party 0.058*** 
(4.68) 
-0.005 
(-0.07) 
Mother Party 0.092*** 
(3.58) 
-0.066 
(-0.43) 
Schooling 0.020*** 
(13.6) 
0.082*** 
(8.15) 
Age 0.007*** 
(2.89) 
0.009 
(0.60) 
Age squared -0.0006 
 (-0.24) 
0.0001 
(0.05) 
Male 0.033*** 
(2.62) 
0.147* 
(1.80) 
Log-pseudo likelihood -1249 -40,494 
Left-censored 
observations 
   118 
Endogeneity test for 
Party 
(Wu-Hausman F test) 
 0.12 
p-value=0.72 
Observations 4033 3581 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-values. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10% 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. Values not in parentheses are marginal effect for probit estimation and an 
estimate of the semi-elasticity ( d(lny)/d(x) ) for Tobit estimation. The following variables are also 
included but the results are not reported: residential province dummies, health status dummies, 
dummies for location of school respondents where graduated, dummies for number of family members, 
occupation dummies, dummies for ownership form of employer, marital status dummies and constant. 
Results for endogeneity test are obtained when 2SLS estimation is conducted on the condition that 
exogenous instrumental variables are Father Party and Mother Party.  
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Table 5.Results for the male sample. 
 (1) 
Dependent variable: 
Party 
 
Model: 
Probit estimation 
(2) 
Dependent variable: 
Income 
 
Model: 
Tobit estimation 
Party  0.232** 
(2.13) 
Height 0.005*** 
(3.07) 
0.019** 
(2.46) 
Father Party 0.100*** 
(4.44) 
0.007 
(0.07) 
Mother Party 0.073* 
(1.67) 
-0.183 
(-0.83) 
Schooling 0.029*** 
(10.7) 
0.082*** 
(5.72) 
Age 0.012** 
(2.55) 
0.021 
(0.96) 
Age squared -0.00003 
 (-0.49) 
-0.0001 
(-0.71) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -810 -23,204 
Left-censored 
observations 
   30 
Endogeneity test for 
Party 
(Wu-Hausman F test) 
 0.07 
p-value=0.78 
Observations 2136 1979 
Notes: See Table 4 
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Table 6.Results for the female sample. 
 (1) 
Dependent variable: 
Party 
 
Model: 
Probit estimation 
(2) 
Dependent variable: 
Income 
 
Model: 
Topbit estimation 
Party  0.193** 
(2.33) 
Height 0.002* 
(1.83) 
0.008* 
(1.68) 
Father Party 0.026** 
(2.25) 
-0.045 
(-0.71) 
Mother Party 0.115*** 
(3.85) 
0.212 
(1.61) 
Schooling 0.012*** 
(7.85) 
0.072*** 
(8.18) 
Age 0.004 
(1.60) 
-0.023* 
(-1.79) 
Age squared -0.00001 
 (-0.03) 
0.003** 
(2.55) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -401 -16,554 
Left-censored 
observations 
   88 
Endogeneity test for 
Party 
(Wu-Hausman F test) 
 1.36 
p-value=0.24 
Observations 1837 1602 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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Table 7. Parent’s membership effect through political channel on income. 
 All Male Female 
Political channel    
Father membership 1.29% 2.34% 0.51% 
  Mother membership 2.04% 1.69% 2.22% 
Market channel    
Father membership No    No    No 
  Mother membership    No    No    No 
Note: Membership effect is calculated based on results of Tables 4-6 as follows: (A) effect 
of father’s (mother’s) membership on probability that the respondent is a Communist 
Party member. (B) Effect of being a Communist Party member on income. Then, (A) 
multiplied by (B) indicates effect of father’s (mother’s) membership on income.  
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Table 8. Channel of height’s effect on income. 
 All Male Female 
Effect of additional 1 cm 
on income  
   
Market channel 1.56 %  1.84% 0.82% 
  Political channel 0.07 % 0.11% 0.03% 
Note: The political channel is calculated based on the results of Tables 4-6 as follows: (A) 
effect of 1cm increase in height on the probability that the respondent is a Communist 
Party member. (B) Effect of being a Communist Party member on income. Then, (A) 
multiplied by (B) indicates the effect of height through the political channel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
